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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the relationship between affiliate firms’ perception of political instability and 
their headquarters’ investment decision in the South Caucasus region. Results based on the BEEPS 
(Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey) data suggest that the perception of 
political instability does not have a significant effect on the company's decision to invest or not 
(propensity of FDI) in this region. On the other hand, headquarters which have already made an 
investment prefer to reduce the volume of FDI (intensity of FDI) if their affiliate firms face the 
problem of political instability. This negative effect disappears when firms perceive high 
corruption together with political instability. Presence of oil resources is a significant determinant 
of FDI in the South Caucasus region but there is no significant difference between non-oil and oil 
industries in case of sensitivity to political instability. 
1.Introduction 
 
Broadening linkages of national economies into a worldwide market of goods, services and 
especially capital is one of the key features of globalization. Growth of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) is the most visible consequence of this process. On the other hand, FDI as a source of 
economic growth for transition countries seems to have recently attained the status of a stylized 
fact. Under certain conditions, FDI is the most desirable form of capital inflow in the developing 
countries. Compared to short–term credits and portfolio investments, FDI is more stable in terms 
of changes in political economic environment.  
Higher foreign investments may accelerate country’s economic performance through 
accumulation of more human and physical capital. Foreign direct investment as an additional 
source of investment might be more beneficial than domestic saving for the host economy because 
its spillover effect/positive externalities (Markusen and Venables (1999), Görg and Greenaway 
(2003), Javorcik (2004)). Higher FDI associates with technology and knowledge transfer from 
home to host country (Lipsey (2002), Blomström and Kokko (2003)). Furthermore, higher 
investment and economic growth positively affect country’s socio-political stability. Stable 
political environment is the source of another investment (Alesina and Perotti (1996)). While the 
positive FDI-growth relationship is not unambiguously accepted, positive role of FDI is still 
supported, especially in particular circumstances, when the host country is abundant in high 
qualified human capital (Blomström et al. (1994)), Borensztein et al. (1998)) or financial system 
is well developed (Alfaro et al. (2004)).  
Positive interdependence between FDI and economic performance arises the following important 
question: what can countries do to attract more FDI? Many studies suggest various factors that 
influence location choice of investment by multinational enterprises (MNEs). Some of them are 
firm-level characteristics and others are country-level factors. For example, Helpman, Melitz and 
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Yeaple (2003) concluded that relative productivity is a crucial factor which determines MNEs’ 
investment decision. On the other hand, using cross-sectional data on outward FDI from the U.S, 
Yeaple (2009) confirmed that countries with better investment environment attract more U.S 
MNEs. 
This paper focuses on the host country characteristics, in particular on political instability as an 
impediment of FDI in the South Caucasus region. The South Caucasus is a strategically located 
region, on the border of Europe and Asia, with heterogeneous countries (Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan). Region has all possibilities, such as oil resourses, cheap labor force, good location to 
become a hub of investment in SEE (South East Europe) region. Political stability still remains as 
a main obstacle for foreign investors (Nuriyev (2008), Kakachia (2009)). This makes it a good 
case for identifying the role of political stability in attracting FDI. 
Despite the growing literature about the key aspects of FDI in transition countries, such as: origin, 
incentives, forms, destination by economic sectors and determinants of FDI (Bevan et al. (2004), 
Bevan and Estrin (2004)), there is a gap in FDI literature in the case of the South Caucasus region. 
Studies which already exist mostly concentrate on the characteristics of one particular country 
(McGee (1999) – Armenia, Gulbrandsen and Moe (2007) – Azerbaijan, Cukrowski (2009) - 
Georgia) not the overall business environment in the region. This paper will be a forward step to 
investigate the business climate in the South Caucasus region, concentrating on political 
instability. Study of political instability in regional context is also justified because political 
instability in a host country not only affects its own investment climate but there is an obvious 
spatial dependence which means that political risk in one country has significant negative effect 
on FDI in this region (Ades and Chua (1997), Estrin and Uvalic (2014)). 
On the other hand, the analysis of the consequences of political instability has been a central theme 
in recent macroeconomic research (Barro (1991) – economic growth, Roubini (1991) – budget 
deficit, Cukierman et al. (1992) - seniorage, Collins (1996) – exchange rate). However, the effect 
of political instability on FDI has been studied to lesser extent than several other determinants of 
FDI (Eaton and Tamura (1994) – gravity model, Head et al. (1995) – agglomeration effect, Carr 
et al. (2001) and Bergstrand and Egger (2007) – human and physical capital model).  
Previous papers that concentrate on the effect of political stability on FDI (Alesina and Perotti 
(1996), Campos and Nugent (2003), Brada et al. (2006), Estrin and Uvalic (2014)) simply view 
political instability in terms of an event occurring. For example, number of revolutions, coups and 
assassinations. But most managers' understanding of the concept of political risk, their assessment 
and evaluation of politics, and the manner in which they integrate political information into 
decision making are all rather general, subjective, and superficial1. Main contribution of this paper 
is not just filling the research gap of FDI literature in the South Caucasus region, but also analyzing 
business environment based on the perceptions data. Despite skepticism among economists about 
                                                          
1  Kobrin (1979). 
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reliability of subjective perception data (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Gelb et al. (2007)), it 
has been used in various studies across disciplines and provides useful information (Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2005), Pierre and Scarpetta (2006)). 
To assess the effect of political instability on firm's investment decision this paper uses data from 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 2009 (BEEPS)2. We have to point out 
that we observe affiliate’s perception about business climate but investment decision is made by 
headquarter taking into account this perception. The dissertation concludes that perception of 
political instability significantly deters intensity of FDI, but does no play a significant role in case 
of the propensity of FDI. Furthermore, non-exporting foreign firms are more sensitive to political 
instability than exporting ones. Oil resource is significant determinant of FDI but there is no 
difference between non-oil and oil industries in case of sensitivity to political instability. 
In general, FDI is a forward looking decision meaning that not only one obstacle but different 
obstacles together may play a significant role. Checking the complementarity between obstacles 
in case of propensity/intensity of FDI shows that there is a lack of complementarity between 
perception of political instability and corruption means that high perception of political instability 
compensates the negative effect of corruption. 
This paper is organized as follow. Section 2 is literature review. Section 3 describes the investment 
climate in the South Caucasus region. Section 4 explains data and model. Section 5 presents 
empirical results. Section 6 checks the complementarity between obstacles. The last section 
concludes. 
2.Literature review 
 
2.1.Determinants of FDI 
 
At some stage companies make the decision about extending their activities abroad. There are 
several methods of accessing to foreign market; one is making direct investment in the host country 
means that an investor from one country makes a long-term financial participation in an enterprise 
in the other country with significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise (at 
least 10% share of capital plus technology and know-how transfer indicating a “significant” degree 
of influence)3. 
                                                          
2 In case of Georgia survey period coincides with armed conflict with Russia in 2008. This might affect the perceptions 
and also final result. Petracco and Schweiger (2010) checked the differences between perceptions before and after the 
war based on dif-dif method and concluded that the effect of war on the perception of political instability is not 
significant. 
3 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
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Investing in another country has some benefits but also costs. When advantages are assumed to be 
higher than the expected risks, investment decision is justified. According to the “OLI” paradigm 
(Dunning (1993)) the decision of making foreign investment is based on the three types of 
advantages: Ownership (O), Locational (L) and Internalization (I). 
Ownership advantages also known as Firm Specific Advantages (FSAs) (Rugman (1984)) contain 
reputation, brand name, know-how and other non-intangible assets, such as patents, technology 
which only belongs to foreign firm. These FSAs enable the firm to cover the added costs of 
operating in a foreign country. 
Only certain types of firms are able to use ownership advantages through internalization (I). 
Internalization theory (Buckley and Casson (1998b), (2009)) explains the practice of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) to execute transactions within their organization rather than relying on an 
arm’s length transactions (market transactions). Internalization prevents other firms to copy the 
foreign firm’s technology to maintain the monopoly power. When the firm is not able to internalize 
the whole production process abroad it chooses licensing to enter to the foreign market.  
These two advantages are mostly location-independent and closely connected to firms’ motives to 
invest abroad. Locational (L) advantage determines the attractiveness of the host country. Within 
the trinity of conditions for FDI to occur, locational determinants are the only ones that host 
governments can influence directly. This is the reason why countries try to cut their taxes, create 
free economic zones, reduce the trade and investment barriers and create investment opportunities 
for foreign investors. 
Locational specific determinants can be grouped into three broad categories4: 
 Policy framework for FDI:  
Without attractive foreign investment legislation no FDI will take place in a host country. In 
general, foreign liberalization policy, such as free trade agreements and openness to foreign capital 
are supportive to FDI inflow (Tuman and Morris (1998)). Political factors of the OLI model also 
emphasize the importance of the host country’s political environment (Haggard (1988)). Some 
political instability models claim that firms reject countries because of their political instability 
(Howell and Chadwick (1994)). For instance, revolutionary movements may threaten the security 
of multinational firms. As a result, companies can avoid investing in countries that are 
experiencing revolutionary movements (Frey (1985), Asiedu (2002)). 
 Economic determinants for FDI. 
There are four classical economic location-specific determinants for FDI (Dunning, 1993): 
 Market-seeking (horizontal) FDI. Countries with huge markets and high growth potential 
are the main destinations for foreign capital (Markusen (1984), Helpman (1984)). The 
                                                          
4 World Investment Report: Trends and Determinants (1998). 
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market seeking factor explains why huge volume of FDI flows go to China and India. In 
the last decade, FDI in China increased by 7 times, while in India by 5 times5. 
 Efficiency-seeking (vertical) FDI takes place when a firm wants to minimize its production 
cost and splits the value chain process between different countries (Baltagi et al. (2005)).  
 Resource seeking FDI is closely related to efficiency seeking FDI. Interdependence comes 
from the fact that when country has abundant natural resources it makes this factor cheaper. 
Efficiency and resource seeking factors are assumed as a motivation of investment in 
transition countries (Campos and Kinoshita (2003)). 
 Asset seeking FDI is the fastest growing motive of FDI between these four motives and 
contains patents, brands and other tangible and intangible assets. This type of FDI is 
leading in case of Azerbaijan due to its strategic asset, oil. According to IMF estimates, 
between 75% and 82% of total FDI in Azerbaijan is in oil and gas industry. Besides, 30% 
of investment invested in other parts of economy is related to investments in oil and gas 
industry (Tondel (2001)). 
 
Transition process is always related to high level of privatization as a way to change the market 
structure and approach market economy. As a result, foreign investors can buy strategic assets 
with affordable prices, due to supportive tax policy and sometimes subsides to foreign investors 
(Perotti et al. (2001)). 
 
 Business facilitation of FDI.  
Business promotion, after-investment services and other measures that facilitate business 
transactions improve business environment and attract foreign investors. Financial or fiscal 
incentives are also used to encourage investments. These incentives work only when other 
important economic determinants are in place (Blomström and Kokko (2002)). 
Another approach to analyze FDI inflows is gravity method which suggests that main drivers of 
trade/foreign investment flows are:  
 
 Market size of the host economy; this type of motive is similar to market seeking FDI.  
 Market size of the source economy; 
 Distance between host and source countries (Klienert and Toubal (2010)). 
 
An important result of these models is that factor endowments matter significantly for FDI 
patterns. In addition to the traditional gravity variables, such as tradeoff between trade and FDI 
(proxied by distance between countries) and home and host market sizes (proxied by GDP) 
contemporary literature additionally considers: 
 
                                                          
5 World Bank. World Development Indicators. 
 
9 
 
 Membership of international trade and economic associations; for example, the effect of 
announcement of association with European Union (EU) membership (Bevan and Estrin 
(2004)); 
 Agglomeration effect. For instance, location of other Japanese firms in US state affects 
subsequent FDI for a Japanese MNE. (Head et al. (1995)).  
 Corruption. Variety of corruption indices are strongly and negatively correlated with FDI 
(Hines (1995), Wei (2000)). 
 Political stability. In the case of Balkan countries, conflict and instability reduce FDI inflows 
(Brada et al. (2006)). 
 
To conclude, analyzing locational determinants of FDI through political factors of the OLI model 
is a new approach and it emphasizes on how political instability might deter FDI inflows in the 
country. 
 
2.2.Political instability and FDI 
 
Foreign direct investment is a forward-looking activity and has long-lasting results means that the 
decision about investing is not static but dynamic process taking into consideration host country’s 
future perspectives. So, foreign investors are sensitive to political factors which are closely 
connected to economic volatility (Wei (2000), Aseidu (2005)). 
Political instability hinders economic development through its effect on the accumulation of 
physical and human capital (Alesina et al. (2005)). Foreign direct investments are often difficult 
to reverse means that investors can postpone new capital projects until the clarification of policy 
environment. Political risk remains one of the main obstacles for foreign investment in emerging 
markets and it is likely to continue being so over the medium term6. 
This part of the dissertation aims to explain the existing literature which explain how political 
instability affects FDI inflow.  There is almost no literature available which explains the impact of 
political instability on FDI in the South Caucasus region. The lack of literature motivates the 
analysis in this dissertation. 
Before 1980s most studies were concentrated on either only economic or political factors instead 
of checking their joint significance. Frey and Schneider (1985) were first who test the explanatory 
power of the following four types of models: a) models that concentrate exclusively on political 
determinants, such as, political instability; b) models that concentrate exclusively on economic 
determinants, such as, GDP growth, inflation, balance of payment, wage cost, skilled labor force; 
c) model that uses as the sole determinant an international risk indicator, an amalgamation of 
economic and political factors and d) Politico-economic model  that simultaneously includes 
                                                          
6 World Investment and Political Risk (2009). 
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political  and economic determinants. They concluded that foreign direct investment in developing 
countries is simultaneously determined by economic and political factors.  
When we know that political instability together with economic variables determine FDI flows, 
the next step is to identify the channels and direction of relationship between political instability 
and investment.  
There is a well-developed literature that examines the relationship between host country political 
instability and FDI inflow. Alesina and Perotti (1996) investigated the link between income 
distribution and investment through political instability and showed that political instability had a 
negative effect on investment in a sample of 70 countries from 1960 to 1985. Based on the data of 
reported manufacturing plants openings from 1984 to 1987, Woodward and Rolfe (1993) found 
that political stability increases the attractiveness of a country to be selected as an investment 
location. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) created a two stage analysis of FDI inflows, based on the 
data of US MNEs to 143 countries during 1994 – 1997. First stage investigated the causal factors 
that a country is a FDI recipient or not while the second stage examined the determinants of the 
amount of FDI. They concluded that an index of political instability did not influence the 
attractiveness of the country, but reduced the amount of FDI inflow to a country. 
Li (2006) tried to explain how political violence, an extreme form of political instability, affected 
foreign direct investment. Schneider and Frey (1985) found that political instability had a negative 
effect on FDI flows. Using a cross sectional data of FDI inflows in 36 countries for only two years 
1977 and 1982, Loree and Guisinger (1995) showed that political stability significantly promotes 
FDI inflows in 1982, but not in 1977. Busse and Hefeker (2007), using data sample of 83 
developing countries between 1984 and 2003, concluded that government stability, the absence of 
internal and external conflicts are significant determinants of foreign investment inflows. Meon 
and Sekkat (2008) raised the issue that the sensitivity of foreign investors to political risk in a 
particular country depends on global FDI flows at a given point in time; when FDI is booming, 
investors are less sensitive to political risk. 
Brada et al. (2006) studied the impact of transition and political instability in case of Central 
Europe, the Baltics and the Balkans. This paper concluded that in the case of Balkan countries, 
conflict and instability reduced FDI inflow. Balkan region is more deeply analyzed in Estrin and 
Uvalic (2014) paper. This paper explored the determinants of foreign direct investment into eight 
transition economies in Southeast Europe (SEE) and concluded that FDI to the Balkans are driven 
by geographical and institutional factors, similarly to other transition economies, but there is 
evidence of a significant negative regional effect because of politically unstable environment.  
Political instability also has indirect effect on investment through economic growth (market 
seeking FDI). For example, Barro (1991) found that political instability negatively affects 
economic growth and investment. He found that measures of political instability, such as coups, 
revolutions, and political assassinations, are inversely correlated with the growth of GDP and 
investment share of the GDP. Alesina et al. (1996), based on data of 113 countries from 1950 till 
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1982, concluded that in countries with a high propensity of government collapse, growth is 
significantly lower than otherwise. Alesina and Tabellini (1989), Ozler and Tabellini (1991), 
Cukierman et al. (1992) made the similar conclusion that political instability leads to weaker 
economic performance. 
Political instability in the host country not only affects its own investment climate but there is an 
obvious spatial dependence which means that political risk in one country has significant negative 
effect of FDI in this region. Ades and Chua (1997) based on the data of 118 countries over the 
sample period 1960 to 1985, examined the effect of political instability on regional investment 
potential. The result shows that regional instability has a significant negative effect on economic 
growth.  
The effect of political stability on investment and economic growth is not an unambiguous one.  
Campos and Nugent (2003), based on the data from 1960 till 1995 from 98 developing countries, 
found no evidence of the hypothesized negative and causal relationship between political 
instability and economic growth. Similar conclusion is reached by Bennett and Green (1972) but 
in more specific case, based on data from marketing. They explored the difference between theory 
and reality. For instance, international marketers say that political instability is important to their 
investment decisions but their actions do not confirm this. Another study, by Olibe and Crumbley 
(1997) did not find significant evidence that a political risk influences U.S. FDI flows to 10 out of 
13 OPEC countries. Li and Resnick (2003) showed that political instability does not have a 
significant effect on FDI, yet “regime durability” encourages such investment. Wheeler and Mody 
(1992) reported that political risk has an insignificant effect on United States MNE location 
decisions. Similar results were reported by Asiedu (2002) and Bevan and Estrin (2004) on different 
subgroups of countries. In a pooled data of 52 developing countries between 1982 and 1995, Sethi 
et al. (2003) found that political instability did not influence U.S. FDI flows to 28 countries 
between 1981 and 2000.  
Political instability is an obstacle not only for foreign investors but also has significant negative 
effect on domestic saving and capital outflows. As we mentioned above agglomeration effect plays 
a crucial role for foreign investors when they make a decision of investment (Du et al. 2008). 
Alesina and Tabellini (1989), using general equilibrium model in the case of developing countries, 
provide an explanation why political instability causes private capital outflows and relatively low 
domestic capital formation in developing countries. 
Similarly, Ketkar and Ketkar (1989) investigated the determinants of capital flight from Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico and found that political risk was an important factor in all three countries. 
Levine and Renelt (1992) concluded that number of revolutions and coups per year is negative 
correlated with the investment share of gross domestic product. Bailey and Chung (1995) studied 
the impact of political risk on the Mexican stock market and found a significant link between 
political risk and the equity premium. Kutan and Perez (2002) examined the significance of socio-
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political instability and organized crime in Colombia on that country's stock market prices and 
found a significant connection.  
Other channel how political instability affects FDI inflows in the host country is through physical 
and human capital accumulation. Efficiency and market seeking determinants of FDI are leading 
in case of the South Caucasus region (cheap labor force in Georgia and Armenia and huge 
resources in Azerbaijan). Based on cross-country data and use of Cobb-Douglas production 
function, Benhabib and Spiegel (1992) concluded that presence of human capital makes countries 
more attractive, while political instability may deter it. 
Above we reviewed the studies which are mostly concentrate on the direct effect of political 
instability on FDI. On its own political instability is an important part of institutional development. 
Furthermore, political stability mostly determines the stability of the whole institutional system. 
Thus, it is interesting to check the joint effects of political instability interaction with other factors 
of institutional development on business environment. Campante et al. (2009) assessed U-shaped 
relationship between political stability and corruption. Such non-monotonic relationship comes 
from the two effects: horizon effect and demand effect. The idea of horizon effect is related to the 
fact that lower level of stability reduces the existing government’s decision-making horizon, which 
lead to more corruption (steal more today instead of accumulate resources for the future). This 
horizon effect can be assumed as a supply side of this relationship (decreasing part of U shape 
curve). On the other hand, private sector is more willing to pay bribes in case of stable government 
– demand effect (increasing part of U shape curve). Moreover, Fredriksson and Svensson (2002) 
developed a theory of environmental policy formation, taking into account the degree of corruption 
and political instability. They figured out that effects of political instability and corruption on 
policy formation are interdependent. Further, political instability has a negative effect on the 
stringency of environmental policy when corruption is low, but this negative effect vanishes when 
corruption is high. 
To conclude, there are different channels how political instability might affect foreign direct 
investment but the relationship is not always obvious. The crucial point based on literature review 
is that political instability is not only country level characteristic but it also has negative influence 
on the whole region. This argument supports our sampling to study the impact of political 
instability not only on a specific country but analyses it in regional context. On the other hand, we 
have to analyze not only the direct effect of political instability on business climate but interaction 
with other institutional factors. 
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2.3.Measure of political instability 
 
Although there is an increasing academic interest in the intersection of politics and international 
business, the definition of “political instability/risk” is limited. In most cases political instability 
is associated to government interference with business operations, such as: change the terms of 
agreements, confiscation of wholly/partially foreign owned business property (Weston and Sorge 
(1972), Aliber (1975)). 
Political instability can be viewed in two ways. The first one is concentrated on executive 
instability. The second one is linked to social unrest. Based on the first approach political 
instability is defined as a “propensity to observe government changes” which can be constitutional 
or unconstitutional (Alesina and Perroti (1996)). It should be noted that a propensity of government 
changes and real government changes are two different indicators. The second approach of 
measuring political instability is based on the construction of an index which summarizes different 
variables of social unrest (Hibbs (1973), Barro (1991), Ozler and Tabellini (1991)). It is not 
obvious which of two measures is preferable. Both indices measure political instability in terms of 
an event occurring not environment in which firms make a decision. The limitation of such 
measures is highlighted in Robock’s (1971) definition that political environments are dynamic 
which means that gradual and progressive changes neither expected nor unexpected are not 
associated with political risk.  
In reality, the decision of FDI is made by managers' based on the concept of political risk, their 
assessment and evaluation of politics which is so subjective and superficial (Kobrin (1979)). 
Instability is a feature of the environment. The study makes it clear that obstacles to investment 
exist in the mind of the investors7.  So, using perception data to measure political instability is a 
significant advantage.  
There is no clear relationship between political risk variables and FDI based on econometric 
studies, but findings based on perception data support the view that MNEs take into account 
political risk in their investment decisions. Early studies (Aharoni (1966), Bass et al. (1977) 
showed that political stability is a significant factor in investment decisions. The similar conclusion 
is reached by Agtmael (1976) that typical response to political risk is to avoid it by investing in 
more stable country. 
Nowadays, there is growing evidence that political risk not only influence investment decisions, 
but is also reflected in various business surveys. An Economist Intelligence Unit survey of 602 
investors (2007) found that companies expected political risk to become a much greater problem 
for investments in the future than in the recent past, especially in emerging markets8.  A survey by 
Ernst & Young assumed political risk as a main investment obstacle for companies in developed 
                                                          
7 National Industrial Conference Board. Obstacles and Incentives to Private Foreign Investment, 1967-68, Volume I: 
Obstacles. NY: National Industrial Conference Board, 1969.  
8 World Investment Prospects to 2011 (2007). 
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countries (Ernst & Young, 2007). Based on survey data, Grant Thornton (2008) found that stability 
which includes both political and economic stability are equally important with market size and 
growth potential when determining FDI location.  
In this dissertation we use the perception of political instability by foreign affiliate firms which 
covers all aspects of political environment which interrupt current operation of the company. So 
we follow the idea that managers' of headquarters get the information about political environment 
from the host country employees (Zink (1973), Keegan (1974)). 
3.Investment Climate in South Caucasus region 
 
The transition process in the South Caucasus region proceed differently, rather than in Baltic 
Region and other CEE countries. The most difficult was the early stage because of weak 
institutional capacity, poor economic heritage, wide bureaucracy and high corruption which cause 
the conflicts and political instability. As a result, the region failed to create incentives for 
investments (Hübner (2011)). However, after mid 1990s the countries of South Caucasus region: 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan started stabilization policies but different processes took place 
in these countries and nowadays the following reality we have. Oil industry is leading force of 
Azerbaijan economy but country still has problems regarding corruption and trade barriers which 
deteriorate business environment. Countries, such as Georgia and Armenia with limited resources 
create flexible business climate to attract more FDI.  
 
Azebaijan 
Azebaijan attracts majority of foreign investment in this region (68% of total foreign direct 
investment in the South Caucasus region)9 because of oil industry. Huge success of Azerbaijan in 
attracting investments in the oil sector is not as visible as in case of non-oil sector. There are several 
reasons for the limited investment attractiveness outside oil sector. Azerbaijan is assumed as an 
autocratic system with high corruption, huge informal market, sector monopolies and entry barriers 
together with inappropriate monetary conditions. Domestic market is rather small and trade 
barriers are relatively high, consequently Azerbaijan gets also only 94th position out of 189 
countries in World Bank Doing Business Ranking, Trade Across Borders, 2016. Banking sector is 
still underdeveloped (109 position out of 189 countries in World Bank Doing Business Ranking, 
Getting Credit, 2016). 
 
                                                          
9 World Bank. World Development Indicators 2014. 
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Georgia 
Georgia attracts 25% of regional FDI. The foreign direct investment in Georgia is more efficiency 
seeking (cheaper labor resources and factory costs (taxes, trade barriers, transportation costs)). 
Georgia made an impressive progress in improving investment climate. According to the “Ease of 
doing business” indicator of World Bank, Georgia improved its position from 112 in 2005 to 24 
in 201610. Georgia is named as a corruption free country where rule of law has been given the right 
way based on Global Corruption Barometer indicator. Despite its small home market size, Georgia 
has the access to market of 900 mln. people without customs duties. Besides these progressive 
steps political stability still remains the main obstacle for foreign investors which is proved by 
Political Stability Index (lowest position in Europe with Ukraine and Russia). Political and 
economic stability was under serious question mark in 2008 when Georgia had a military conflict 
with its neighbor country – Russia. After the war Georgia is still trying to return to post war 
position as a stably growing secure economy. 
 
Armenia 
Armenia attracts only 7% of total regional foreign direct investments. Similar to Georgia, in 
Armenia investment is efficiency seeking rather than resource seeking as in Azerbaijan. Armenia 
made a significant progress toward liberalization of its economy after the breakup of the Soviet 
Union. Location is one of the crucial factor which makes Armenia a preferable destination for 
foreign investments because it provides an access to the former Soviet republics. Armenia with 
only 3 mln. population offers cheap labor force to foreign investors which is an additional 
advantage factor. Alongside with these advantages, corruption remains a significant obstacle to 
foreign investment.  Government introduced number of reforms in the last few years against 
corruption, but in judiciary, tax and customs operations, health, education, and law enforcement 
areas corruption still remains as a huge problem. According to the Transparency International (TI) 
2014 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) report, Armenia tied for rankings 94th among 176 
countries. Another important obstacle for investors is unsolved conflict with Azerbaijan for 
Nagorno-Karabakh (Croissant (1998)).  
In overall, the South Caucasus region with its natural resources and strategic location creates 
opportunities for foreign direct investments but unsolved conflicts, such as: Abkhazia, South 
Othetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, high level of corruption, political instability still appear to 
deteriorate investment climate in the South Caucasus region.   
 
                                                          
10 World Bank. Doing Business 2016. 
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4.Data and model 
 
4.1.Data 
 
The primary data used in this study is BEEPS 2009 (Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey), collected in a joint project of the EBRD and the World Bank and covers 11 
998 enterprises through 29 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (including Kosovo)11.  
A typical problem of using survey data is possible survey respondents’ perception bias (Kaufman 
and Wei (1999)). There are two possible sources of perception bias. One is country level perception 
bias. In some countries their citizens or firms may "complain" more than in other countries even 
face the same objective obstacles. Country level perception bias comes from different cultural 
norms or degree of political freedom. Second type of bias is linked to individual firm level. For 
example, some firms may subjectively provide positive or negative answer about political 
instability depending on their overall perception of the business climate. Assuming that the bias is 
uncorrelated among groups of respondents, individual perception bias affects only standard errors 
of estimates obtained from the survey responses.  
Fries et al. (2003) checked such perception bias based on the BEEPS 2002 data by comparing 
measures obtained from the survey responses and objective measures and find no significant 
perception biases across the countries. If we assume that BEEPS 2009 follows a similar 
methodology as BEEPS 2002, we may conclude that perception bias will not affect our results (De 
Rosa et. al (2010)). 
BEEPS assesses the local environment for private enterprises and business development. BEEPS 
sample is selected using stratified random sampling with three levels of stratification: 
 Industry; 
 Establishment size; 
 Region.  
In industry level three different sectors are represented: manufacturing, service and other services. 
Size stratification uses following coding: small (less than 19 permanent, full-time employees), 
medium (20 to 99 permanent, full-time employees), and large (more than 99 permanent, full-time 
employees). 
BEEPS dataset has several advantages relative to the datasets used in previous studies, such as: 
cross-country panel data (Alesina and Perotti (1996), Alesina et al. (1996)). Most crucial advantage 
is that the BEEPS data enables us to extract valuable information about not only firm 
characteristics but also firms’ perceptions about business environment, for example political 
stability, access to finance etc. in the country. 
                                                          
11 We are using BEEPS 2009 instead of recent survey in 2014 because the BEEPS 20014 does not cover Azerbaijan. 
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After cleaning the data from outliers, we have 818 enterprises from South Caucasus region, more 
specifically 247 observations from Georgia, 306 - from Azerbaijan and 265 - from Armenia (Table 
4 in Annex 1). Firms which are owned by private foreign individuals with a share more than 10% 
are classified as a foreign firm. From the whole sample (818 enterprises) 91% of firms are 
classified as a local and remaining 9% - foreign firm. Distribution of foreign firms by countries is 
the following: Georgia (24%), Azerbaijan (47%) and Armenia (29%). 
Based on the sample 54% of firms are assumed as a small firm, 32% - medium size firm and 14% 
- large. 39% of whole foreign direct investments go to medium size firms, 33% - large firms and 
the least attractive is small size firms (28%) (Table 5 in Annex 1). Sample covers firms from 18 
different industries (Table 6 in Annex 1). Most representative are enterprises from retail industry 
(34%), food (13%) and construction (13%). The structure of local and foreign firms by industry is 
similar. For foreign investors most attractive industries are: food (25% of whole FDI), retail (19%) 
and construction (8%).  The distribution of foreign direct investment shows that 31% of foreign 
direct investments are full ownership (100%). This kind of investments are very often in Armenia 
(43%) and Azerbaijan (44%), but in case of Georgia the highest portion of FDIs (35%) come to 
41-65% ownership.   
Foreign and local firms in the South Caucasus region face many constraints in current operations. 
Based on the firms’ perceptions, political instability is in top five major obstacles. The ranking of 
obstacles shows that there is no huge difference between ownership types. 11.1% of foreign firms 
assume political instability as a major obstacle for their current operations while 10.6% of local 
firms think so. 
As a further control of perception bias we created two different specification of political instability. 
BEEPS collects information on self-reported measures of political instability. Specifically, firms 
are asked to report on a 0 (“No obstacle”) to 4 (“very severe obstacle”) scale, how problematic 
political instability is for the current operation. It is quite subjective what the distinction between 
categories is. On the other hand, such scale measure is the source of individual bias. To address to 
the problem, we created political instability dummy. It equals to 1 if political instability is indicated 
as a minor, moderate, major or very severe obstacle and 0 otherwise (De Rosa et. al (2010)).   
Second specification comes from the country level bias. In order to control our estimates for such 
country effects we transformed the responses into binary responses, according to whether or not 
the response to each question is above or below the average country response (we follow the 
similar coding of obstacle variables as in Roller and Mohnena (2005) study). Table 8 in Annex 1 
presents the correlations between three different specifications of political instability. It is visible 
that both specification are highly correlated with initial measure. 
Another limitation of this data is that we measure country level variable, such as political 
instability, based on the firm level perception. So, it is important to check the relationship between 
our subjective and more objective country level political instability indices, such as:   
 Political instability index by The Economist;  
 Political Stability and Absence of Violence by World Bank.  
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Table 4 in Annex 3 shows the correlations between country average perception of political 
instability according to BEEPS data and two other political instability indices. Correlations 
between BEEPS and The Economist Index and BEEPS and WGI are not the same. This is quite 
logical because these two country level political instability indices are based on different 
methodologies. Correlation is higher in case of The Economist and equals to 0.42. Furthermore, 
after checking the ranking of the countries12 based on these three different measures, rank test 
shows that there is no significant difference between ranking means that our subjective perception 
data gives the similar general picture as other more objective measures.  
 
 
4.2.Model 
 
Instead of classic FDI location studies which are based on the different possible locations of 
affiliates for each MNEs, this dissertation focuses on firms from only one region. In order to 
investigate the relationship between political instability and FDI we use two step (probit + 
truncated) model. On the first stage, estimated by probit model, we compute the probability for 
each firm to be foreign.  If foreign ownership is less than 10% firm is assumed as a local (=0), 
otherwise foreign (=1). As a measure of foreign ownership we use the percent of the firm owned 
by private foreign individuals, companies or organization.  Firm is foreign owned if a latent 
variable, FDI* is positive13. The explanatory variables of the probability that a firm is foreign or 
local are firm level information as well as firms’ perception of investment climate constraints, 
including the perception of political instability. 
𝐹𝐷𝐼 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝐷𝐼∗ > 0 
𝐹𝐷𝐼 = 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
𝐹𝐷𝐼∗𝑖𝑗 = 𝑏 × 𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝑐 × 𝑞𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                    (1) 
𝑞𝑖𝑗 is the perception of political instability of firm 𝑖 in 𝑗 country.  𝑋𝑖𝑗 is a vector of other factors 
which determine the probability of being a foreign firm. 𝑏 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐 are parameter vectors to estimate. 
We can call this equation as a “propensity of receiving FDI”. 
On the first stage, we try to answer the following questions: what are the characteristics of foreign 
owned firms and are there any country level obstacles which affect the propensity of FDI? Our 
data gives us opportunity to expand our analysis and explore the determinants of intensity of FDI. 
When firm has more than 10% of foreign share it is assumed as a foreign firm but what factors 
                                                          
12  See Table 5 in Annex 3. 
13 Our data covers not only local firms which have some foreign share but also includes Greenfield investment with 
full foreign ownership. In case of Greenfield investment latent variable is always positive they started their operation 
as foreign firms. There are only 14 firms (out of 72 foreign firms) with Greenfield investment but they do not affect 
the general picture. In case of excluding this type of investment the sign and the significance of coefficients are the 
same. 
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determine the volume of such foreign share. Do firm level characteristics still play a crucial role 
or other country level factors determine it? To answer the mentioned questions we use a truncated 
regression (based on OLS). 
 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾 × 𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇 × 𝑞𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗    𝑖𝑓 10% < 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 < 100%    (2)      
                                             
𝑋  is a vector of determinants other than political instability, 𝛾 is a parameter vector, 𝜇 is the 
parameter to estimate. This equation is denoted as a “FDI intensity equation”.  
Explanatory variables determine propensity/intensity of FDI are firm level information as well as 
affiliate firms’ perception of investment climate constraints. In case of firm level characteristics 
we control affiliate firm’s size, age, production diversification and productivity. Larger firms, 
measured by log of permanent full-time workers, have more resources; they can take more risk 
and therefore are more likely to be foreign owned (Blomström and Zejan (1991), Javorcik and Wei 
(2009), Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010)). Age of the firm is the log of the number of years 
since the firm began operation in the country. There are two possible explanations: older firms 
already developed routines and are less likely to receive FDI. Another view is that older firms 
already accumulated huge knowledge which is additional motives for foreign headquarters to 
invest in this affiliate company. There is a prior evidence for both hypotheses (Gorodnichenko and 
Schnitzer (2010), Kinda (2010)).  
Product diversification measured by “share of first largest product/service category in total sales” 
is another firm level characteristic which might affect firm’s ownership type. Diversified firms are 
more likely to have a minority ownership and thus more likely to engage in joint ventures (Meyer 
(1998), Javorcik and Wei (2009)). Foreign owned firms tend to be more productive than 
domestically owned firms in transition countries (Blomstrom (1988), Haddad and Harrison (1993), 
Aitken and Harrison (1999)). To control such productivity we use the following measure - “sales 
per employee”14. Other crucial firm level variables which are expected to have a positive effect on 
attracting FDI are R&D dummy15 and holding an internationally-recognized quality certificate. 
Except political instability, we also use other country level characteristics. Table 9 in Annex 1 
summarizes the most serious obstacles for the local and foreign firms. For affiliate firms top five 
country level obstacles are: access to finance, tax rates, and practice of competitors in informal 
sector, corruption and political instability. The last one is our interest variable. All these variables 
are based on firms’ perceptions range from “no obstacle – 0” to “very severe obstacle – 4”.  
After making dummies from the perception of political instability we should follow the same 
technique for other country level control variables: tax rates, access to finance, corruption and 
competition to informal sector. 
                                                          
14 We use such a broad measure of productivity instead of value added because of considerable amount of missing 
data. 
15 We use R&D dummy instead of intensity because of limitation of data. 
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Access to finance is the indicator of financial development. When financial sector is developed in 
the country this makes the credits cheaper and also supports country's economic performance 
which might have a possible link to propensity as well as intensity of FDI (Kinda (2010)). Desai 
et al. (2004b) found the evidence that indirect business taxes have a negative effect on FDI that is 
in the same range as corporate income taxes. Practices of competitors in informal sector and 
corruption are indirect costs which increases firm’s operational expenditures and make the host 
county less attractive for foreign investors (Javorcik and Wei (2009), Kinda (2010)). 
Based on the model described above, the central hypothesis that we seek to test are the following: 
 Firms' perception of political instability discourages the probability of getting FDI, i.e., 
 𝑐 < 0;  
 Conditional on FDI taking place, political instability discourages FDI intensity, how much 
investment will be made in the region, i.e., 𝜇 < 0, in the FDI intensity equation. 
 
 
5.Empirical Results  
 
Estimated regressions are based on propensity of FDI and intensity of FDI equations. According 
to the likelihood ratio test we reject Tobit against Probit + truncated model. Insignificant self-
selectivity correction factor in Heckman model supports the argument that error terms in case of 
propensity of FDI equation and intensity of FDI equation are not correlated and we can use Probit 
+ truncated as a main model. Unlinked first and second stage of the model comes from the fact 
that propensity of FDI is mostly determined by firm level characteristics while intensity of FDI is 
more country level specific. 
Starting from a basic model (Table 1 in Annex 2) which includes firm level characteristics together 
with political instability shows that perception of political instability does not have a significant 
effect neither on propensity nor on intensity of FDI. On the other hand, the results correspond to 
the stylized fact that larger, younger and productive firms are more likely to be foreign owned. 
Holding internationally recognized quality certificate, as a non-intangible asset, plays a positive 
role in terms of propensity of FDI. The results are quite robust across different types of models. 
Table 2 in Annex 2 summarizes the results of the model if we add other country level controls, 
such as: tax rates, corruption, access to finance and competition against informal sector. Similar to 
the basic model, large size and low age alongside with holding internationally recognized 
certificate are important characteristics of foreign firms. This result is robust in both specifications. 
Perception of political instability has negative sign and is significant only in intensity equation. 
When affiliate firms’ assume that political stability affects their current operations their 
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headquarters prefer to reduce their share by 31% because the risk of confiscation16. Other country 
level characteristics, such as: corruption, access to finance, informal sector and tax rates do not 
cause the risk of losing businesses. These variables just determine business environment in the 
country. If company is already in the market and faces these constraints it is not willing to increase 
investment but on the other hand there is no necessity to reduce it. 
The effect of perception of corruption on propensity/intensity of FDI is unstable across the 
specifications. Only one country level variable which has significant effect on the first stage is tax 
rates. Despite subjective perceptions of obstacles we can assume that in case of tax rate these 
subjective perceptions is based on objective data. When company makes decision to enter or not 
to some country’s market, it should take into account information about tax rates. So, perception 
of tax rates has significant negative effect on propensity of FDI. High tax rates hamper foreign 
investors. As a result, countries with high tax rates are less likely to attract FDI.  
 
5.1.Robustness check of the empirical results  
 
Different types of FDI (horizontal and vertical) have different motives and therefore face different 
constraints. Analysis of exporting and non-exporting firms gives us opportunity to evaluate the 
importance of political instability for each type of FDI. Based on the structure of ownership, 
foreign firms’ decision to invest in a host country may differ. Instead of full ownership, MNEs 
may prefer a joint venture to reduce risk when investing in a foreign country.  
According to the fact that significant amount of FDIs in the South Caucasus region go to oil 
industry it will be interesting to check how oil industry affects the general picture. Deeper analysis 
by sector gives us the possibility to evaluate how oil and non-oil firms perceive political instability 
and how such perceptions affect their investment decision. 
Other checks of robustness are related to firm level characteristics: firm size and productivity. 
After excluded top 5% largest and productive firms, we will have a more detailed information how 
firm size and productivity affect the relationship between perception of political instability and 
propensity/intensity of FDI. 
In addition, we want to check the possible perception bias based on the regional17 average 
perceptions. The idea of regional average perception comes from the fact that political instability 
is a regional variable and mostly affected by regional characteristics (Petracco and Schweiger 
(2012)). 
                                                          
16 Political instability is an action of national government which prevents business transaction or causes the 
confiscation of wholly or partially foreign owned business properties, Weston and Sorge’s (1972). 
17 BEEPS covers the following regions in the South Caucasus region: Georgia – Tbilisi, Imereti, Kakheti, Kvemo 
Kartli, Mtskheta-Mtianeti, Shida kartli. Armenia – Yerevan, North, South – East, South – West. Azerbaijan – Baku & 
Apsherons, Aranski & Gorno – Shirvanski, Giandja-Kazakhski & Sheki-Zakatalski, Lenkoranski & Kuba-
Khachmazski. 
 
22 
 
Breakdown by export status: Exporting versus non-exporting firms 
 
Data gives us opportunity to test the difference of perceptions between local market and export 
oriented firms18. We are interested in which type of firms perceive political instability more 
problematic. We expect that local market oriented firms are more sensitive to political instability. 
These firms are less flexible to change location because their primary target market is a host 
country.  
Based on the sub-sample of non-exporting firms (Table 4 in Annex 2, column 5) model shows that 
firms which concentrate mainly on host country market (horizontal FDI), hereafter HFDI and 
perceive political instability as an obstacle to current operation are less likely to make an 
investment. On the other hand, firms which already made an FDI they prefer to reduce the volume 
of investment by 45%. The reduction of investment in case of whole sample (exporting + non-
exporting) was only 31%. These results give us the evidence to say that non-exporting firms are 
more sensitive to political instability than exporting firms. 
 
Breakdown by ownership degree: joint-venture and foreign fully-owned firms 
 
It is a stylized fact that most firms are risk averse especially when they make a decision of 
investment. Companies try to reduce uncertainty. One way to enter to a host market but partially 
avoid the risk is to find a local partner as a joint venture. Political instability is a source of 
uncertainty means that join venture investment is less sensitive to political instability than full 
ownership. 
However, joint venture is a way of sharing the macroeconomic risks, such as: political instability 
but it arises the possible risk between ventures in decision making process. To avoid such within 
company risk, foreign ventures try to increase their share to make individual decision. So the 
trade-off between macro and micro risks are obvious. 
The results based on only joint venture investment (Table 4 in Annex 2, column 2) correspond to 
our main results (Table 2 in Annex 2) in terms of sign and magnitude. This means that being a 
foreign joint venture does not solve the problem of uncertainty. Joint venture investments are as 
sensitive to political instability as the overall investments (joint venture + full ownership). 
Table 3 in Annex 2 represents how the impact of political instability on average foreign share 
gradually decreases as foreign share gets low. On average, companies with high foreign share are 
more sensitive to political instability than companies with lower foreign share. This relationship 
is not monotonic. The idea of nonlinear relationship between perception of political instability and 
foreign share is depicted on the Chart 2 in Annex 2.  Until some threshold of foreign share, firms 
are less sensitive to political instability. When the firm accumulates a considerable amount of 
                                                          
18 Exporting firms are defined such a way =1 if direct + indirect export >10, =0 otherwise. 
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foreign investment, now it takes into account risk of political instability because the risk of 
confiscation. 
Chart 1 in Annex 2 shows that in case of 40% of foreign owned companies the volume of foreign 
share is 86-100%; means that our main results (significant negative effect of political instability 
on foreign share) are mostly driven by companies with more than 86% of higher foreign share. 
 
Breakdown by Oil and Non-oil sector 
 
The oil19 and gas sector had significant impact on the economy of Azerbaijan for several years and 
still continues to grow. Based on the data in 2008, the share of oil & gas industry in Azerbaijan 
FDI was 83.9%, on the other hand the share of Azerbaijan in total regional FDI was 61%. On its 
own oil industry has different patterns than non-oil industry especially when we investigate the 
foreign investment in this sector. Investment in oil industry strongly controlled by Production 
Sharing Agreements (PSA) (Ciarreta and Nasirov (2010)). There are different governmental 
procedures to get the PSA contract. First stage is negotiation between foreign company and 
SOCAR on the PSA terms. Then foreign firm submits the contract to several government 
departments for corrections. After that contract has to be ratified by parliament and the finally 
confirmation by the president. This long procedures arise the question that firms in oil industry is 
closely linked to government and investment in this sector could be more sensitive to political 
instability than in any other industry.  
Column 1 of Table 4 in Annex 2 presents the results of our model in case of non-oil industries. 
Firms in non-oil industry prefer to reduce the volume of investment when they perceive political 
instability as an obstacle. This means that our main result is not only driven from the firms in oil-
industry. 
Firms in oil as well as in non-oil industry are sensitive to political instability in case of intensity 
of FDI but also oil resource itself has significant positive effect on foreign investment (Table 5 in 
Annex 2). 
 
Breakdown by regions: checking perception bias  
 
Some of the business environment aspects are mostly defined at the national level, such as: tax 
rates, access to finance, but on the other hand there are some factors, for instance, political 
instability, competition to informal sector, corruption, which can be influenced by the 
district/region (Petracco and Schweiger (2012)). Data gives us the opportunity to analyze political 
instability on the district level.  
                                                          
19 See definition of oil industry in annex Table 1 in Annex 3. 
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Part 1 of Table 7 in Annex 2 presents average perception of obstacles in different regions. 
Heterogeneity of perceptions between regions in case of country level obstacles, such as, tax rates 
and access to finance arise the question of individual (regional) perception bias. For example, firms 
of region "Imereti" in Georgia have very negative perceptions in every type of obstacles, including 
tax rates and access to finance. To control such bias we follow our first specification. Part 2 of 
Table 7 in Annex 2 shows average perception of political instability in different regions based on 
the political instability dummy.   
Table 6 in Annex 2 shows the results when we have regional average perception of political 
instability instead of individual firm level perception. In case of intensity of FDI, political 
instability is still significant impediment of FDI. 
 
 
6.Complementarity between obstacles 
 
Mix of different obstacles creates a business environment which somehow attracts or deters foreign 
investment. Government is a main player which set the rules, so it has all the possibilities to change 
the environment. All aspects of business climate are regulated by the government. So, stability of 
the government means the stability of the system. As a result, obstacles, such as tax rates, access 
to finance, informal sector and corruption seem to depend on the stability of the government.  
Based on the definition of political instability (Root (1972)) it is an “additional cost” in terms of 
risk of losing of profit potential/assets in international business operations, due to government 
change. Similarly, corruption is also an “additional informal cost” which makes your business 
more costly. If company faces both obstacles together it might be more expensive to maintain the 
possible profit. So, foreign firms which search for the location to earn the highest profit such 
unstable and corrupted business environment will not be preferable.   
Other combinations of obstacles, such as: political instability with tax rates and access to finance 
also arise the questions of complementarity. But in this case tax rates and access to finance are 
now “direct costs” which has to be paid and they are parts of business operations. So, there is no 
direct link how tax rate and access to finance reinforce the negative impact of political instability 
on intensity of FDI. 
From its meaning, informal sector is a business environment with low-paid and poorly secure jobs. 
Competition against informal sector makes firm's costs relatively high. This is an opportunity cost 
of making business legally. In this case there is no obvious complementarity with political 
instability; in general cost that is not measure in terms of monetary units is not significantly taken 
into consideration.  
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Before econometric specification of complementarity we present descriptive evidence based on 
the count statistics. Table 8 in Annex 2 gives information about the frequency of occurrences of 
our 16 states in condition that political instability always holds. Frequency of occurrences is a 
better approach than a linear correlation because as we mentioned above in case of perception of 
political instability and corruption the relationship is non-monotonic. The first column shows all 
the possible combinations between obstacles. From Table 7 it is clear that all these five obstacles 
together is always most common. The problem of this multiple combination is a complicated 
calculation, more appropriate is to use pair-wise combinations (Topkis (1978)), such as: political 
instability and corruption. In case of pairwise complementarity, there are some interesting rules to 
consider. We are trying to identify impediments for foreign investment which means that we are 
searching for obstacles which are faced to foreign firms.  
Third column of Table 8 in annex 2 shows that no foreign firms assume that political instability 
alone is an obstacle while political instability in line with corruption has 22.2% share. Similar 
dependence between these two obstacles also exists in oil industry. Frequency of 11000 is around 
twice higher than frequency of 10000. This kind of relationship is not a case for non-oil industry. 
The result is quite logical because oil industry is more sensitive to governmental activities, such 
as: political instability and corruption than other industries.  
Table 8 in Annex 2 also draws some conclusions about high productive and low productive firms. 
In case of pairwise comparison it is clear that for high productive firms political instability together 
with finance (10100) is more frequent (7%) than any other pairwise combinations. But low 
productive firms still face political instability and corruption together. 
In overall, descriptive statistics give us the first sign that perception of political instability and 
corruption might be linked but still there is a question how they reinforce or weaken each other’s 
effects. This arises the necessity to turn to a more systematic approach, which further controls for 
other exogenous factors. Now we can define complementarity in FDI decision formally by 
checking whether the FDI function is supermodular20 in obstacles. Testing complementarity is the 
same as checking the supermodularity. We have to check the following hypothesis: 
 
𝐻0 ∶  ℎ0 < 0               [Test 1 – strict Supermodularity] 
𝐻1 ∶  ℎ0 ≥ 0 
Where ℎ0 = 𝑠10 + 𝑠01 −  𝑠00 − 𝑠11. This is a test for strict supermodularity. The test accepts 𝐻0   
whenever the constraint is negative. Rejection the null hypothesis does not imply that the two 
obstacles are substitutes, because 𝐻1 includes also the case of equality (ℎ0 = 0). 
 
 
                                                          
20 Detailed methodology see in Annex 3 – Checking the supermodularity. 
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Table 1. Check of complementarity 
  
Political instability  
and  
Corruption 
Political instability  
and  
Finance 
Political instability  
and  
Tax rates 
Political instability  
and  
Informal Sector 
                  
  Propensity   Intensity  Propensity  Intensity  Propensity   Intensity  Propensity   Intensity  
                  
t - test                  
I stage                 
H0 : h0  = 0 H0    H0  H0  H0  H0  H0  H0  
H1 : h0 =/ 0   H1              
P values 0.427 0.008 0.783 0.242 0.699 0.777 0.931 0.162 
II stage                 
H0 : h0   > 0   H0             
H1 : h0 < 0                 
P values   0.995             
 
Table 1 presents two stage t-test for inequality constraint. First stage shows simple check of linear 
equality (𝑠10 + 𝑠01 =  𝑠00 + 𝑠11). Based on this test we can't conclude that there is either 
complementarity or substitutability between perception of political instability and perception of 
the following obstacles, tax rates, access to finance and informal sector. But possible relationship 
between perception of political instability and corruption is still valid. The second stage gives the 
answer to this question that perception of corruption weakens the significant negative impact of 
perception of political instability in intensity of FDI. So, there is a lack of complementarity 
between perception of political instability and corruption. 
 
Table 9 in Annex 2, column 2 indicates that when affiliate company perceives political instability 
as an obstacle to current operation headquarter prefers to reduce investment but on the other hand 
when affiliate faces high corruption together with political instability parent company is indifferent 
in investment decision. Joint effect of political instability and corruption do not have a significant 
effect on intensity of investment. These results are consistent with the conclusion of Fredriksson 
and Svensson (2002). Table 11 in Annex 2 shows the marginal effects of political instability on 
intensity of FDI. When firms perceive that corruption is not an obstacle marginal effect of political 
instability is negative and significant while in case of corruption the effect of political instability 
on FDI is not significantly different from zero. So, corruption is not necessarily bad for MNEs in 
unstable environments. More specifically, when firms perceive that there is an unstable political 
environment in the country they are less willing to pay bribes because the life horizon of existing 
government is limited. If the company does not pay bribes it means that company is free from this 
informal tax, such as bribe. On the other hand, political instability still remains as an obstacle and 
is an additional informal cost. So, we have two opposite effects, because of political instability we 
eliminate negative effect of corruption but political instability itself is a problem and negatively 
affects FDI. This is the reason why the joint effect of political instability and corruption on FDI is 
ambiguous, it is insignificant. 
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Results based on structural model are the logical extension of the conclusions of descriptive 
statistics. We know that in most cases when firm perceive political instability as an obstacle they 
also face high corruption, but these two obstacles do not strengthen but neutralize each other’s 
individual negative effects. If we link our results to U shape relationship between corruption and 
political stability (Chart 1 in Annex 3) we can assume that Armenia with high political instability 
and also high corruption is in preferable condition than Azerbaijan because this high instability 
covers the negative effect of high corruption. Georgia maintains middle position with low level of 
corruption and not a significant instability. If we extend our analysis in the whole region we know 
that overall effect of perception of political instability in intensity of FDI is negative. 
 
We have to point out one important limitation of such complementarity check. Our results are 
based on the perception data and it is difficult to say what are the direct effects of political 
instability and corruption because both of them are strongly affected by the institutional 
development of the country. Moreover, due to the small number of foreign firms in the sample we 
can’t check how sensitive this result is if we exclude some sector or firms from the analysis. This 
means that further studies based on the high quality data will be beneficial.  
 
 
7.Conclusion 
 
Foreign direct investment is a major source of competition between developing countries. This 
paper investigates how perception of investment climate constraints deteriorate FDI attractiveness 
in the South Caucasus region. For investment climate constraint, this paper focuses on perception 
of political instability as an obstacle of current operation. Using firm level data about perception 
of different obstacles, the result shows that when affiliate company perceives political instability 
as an obstacle it does not have a significant effect on headquarters’ decision invest or not in the 
South Caucasus region but on the other hand headquarters which already made a FDI in this region 
are willing to reduce the volume of investment because the risk of confiscation. 
 
A breakdown analysis between oil and non-oil firms shows that perception of political instability 
has significant negative effect on inward FDI not only in oil but also in non-oil industries. On the 
other hand, oil resource itself plays a significant positive role in intensity of FDI. Non-exporting 
firms are more sensitive to political stability than exporting ones. Checking complementarity 
between obstacles shows that institutional development factors, such as political instability and 
corruption mostly occurred together but political instability neutralizes the negative effect of 
corruption. This means that in addition to its own negative effect political instability has also a 
positive effect in improving business environment through compensates the negative effect of 
corruption. In the South Caucasus region the overall effect of political instability on FDI is mostly 
dominated by negative direct of political instability. This means that relative to corruption political 
instability is more serious obstacle for the firms and the region should take a step to stabilize 
political environment if it wants to attract more FDI and encourages higher economic growth. 
 
When discussing about the results we should take into account that using firm level data has its 
own advantages but also it characterizes with some limitations. The perception data is a source of 
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measurement errors. This can lead to endogeneity problem; instrumental variable technique will 
be a good proxy to assign this problem (kinda (2000)). Another method to address the problem is 
simultaneous equations system (Alesina and Perotti (1992)). Political instability affects FDI 
inflows but on the other hand foreign direct investment improves socio-economic stability in the 
country.  
 
Weakness of the perception data is also that it includes many variables explaining the same 
phenomena. This may arise the problem of multicolinearity. One possible solution is to create an 
aggregate index of countries’ institutional development, include this in regression and check the 
effect of general institutional development on propensity/intensity of FDI. If further research is 
related to address these limitations it will be very fruitful.  
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Table 1. Description of variables 
 
Variable name Variable description BEEPS question 
      
Firm level 
characteristics 
    
Foreign share 
 Private foreign individuals, companies or 
organizations  
What percent of this firm is owned by each of the following: 
1.Private domestic individuals, companies or organizations; 
2.Private foreign individuals, companies or organizations 
3.Government/State 
4.Other 
R&D 
Invested in research and development (in-
house or outsourced) in last 3 years? 
In fiscal year 2007, did this establishment spend on research 
and development activities, either in-house or contracted with 
other companies (outsourced)? 
Product 
diversification 
First product/service, percent of total annual 
sales 
What percentage of total sales does the main product 
represent? 
Log (Firm size) 
No. permanent, full-time employees of this 
firm at end of last fiscal year 
At the end of fiscal year 2007, how many permanent, full-
time employees did this establishment employ? Please 
include all employees and managers 
Log (Productivity) Sales per worker 
In last fiscal year, what were this establishment’s total annual 
sales? 
no. permanent, full-time employees of this firm at end of last 
fiscal year 
Log(age) Firm's age 
Year of survey minus the year when the firm was established. 
For the year established: In what year did your firm begin 
operations in this country? 
Certificate 
Internationally-recognized quality 
certification 
Does establishment have an internationally-recognized 
quality certification? 
      
 
40 
 
Perception of 
obstacles     
Political instability 
Obstacle to the current operations : political 
instability 
1. No obstacle 
2. Minor obstacle 
3. Moderate obstacle 
4. Major obstacle 
5. Very Severe obstacle 
6. Do not know* 
7. Does not apply* 
Corruption 
Obstacle to the current operations : 
corruption    
Tax rates Obstacle to the current operations : tax rates   
Access to finance 
How much of an obstacle is: access to 
finance 
Informal sector 
How much of an obstacle are the informal 
sector competitors to your operations? 
 
In our data there are 10% of missing values. So, responses "Do not know" and "Does not apply" are counted as “No obstacle”. But if 
we drop them, the results are similar to the main results in terms of sign and magnitude of the estimators. For example, in case of political 
instability it has negative sign with magnitude 30.0 and significant on 10% level. In our main model the coefficient of political instability 
is -31.4. This means that our results are quite robust despite such specification.
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Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
  
Foreign 
share 
R&D 
Product 
diversification 
Log 
(Productivity) 
Log 
 (Firm 
size) 
Log(age) Certificate 
Political 
instability 
Access 
to 
finance 
Corruption 
Tax 
rates 
Informal 
sector 
                          
Foreign share 1.000                       
R&D 0.035 1.000                     
Product 
diversification -0.002 -0.052 1.000                   
Log 
(Productivity) 0.186 0.271 -0.084 1.000                 
Log (Firm 
size) 0.020 0.178 -0.144 -0.046 1.000               
Log(age) -0.075 0.017 -0.062 0.264 -0.189 1.000             
Certificate 0.248 0.177 -0.008 0.373 0.098 0.059 1.000           
Political 
instability -0.005 0.163 -0.105 0.039 0.342 -0.121 0.083 1.000         
Access to 
finance -0.064 0.014 -0.071 -0.097 0.068 0.036 -0.076 0.138 1.000       
Corruption 0.016 0.043 -0.164 -0.029 0.095 -0.017 0.020 0.283 0.266 1.000     
Tax rates -0.111 -0.011 -0.041 -0.053 0.073 0.033 -0.045 0.199 0.290 0.180 1.000   
Informal 
sector -0.014 0.095 -0.159 -0.084 0.116 0.019 -0.030 0.121 0.325 0.268 0.289 1.000 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 
Number of 
observations 
Mean  
St. 
Dev 
        
Firm level 
characteristics       
Foreign share 818 6.088 21.341 
R&D 818 0.131 0.337 
Product diversification 818 87.123 18.563 
Log (Firm size) 818 3.060 1.275 
Log (Productivity) 818 11.452 3.072 
Log(age) 818 2.314 0.706 
Certificate 818 0.200 0.401 
        
Perception of obstacles       
Political instability 818 1.570 1.536 
Corruption 818 1.462 1.411 
Tax rates 818 1.899 1.316 
Access to finance 818 1.622 1.375 
Informal sector 818 1.571 1.481 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Foreign 
Ownership     
  0 1     
          
Georgia 230 17   247 
Azerbaijan 272 34   306 
Armenia 244 21   265 
          
South 
Caucasus 746 72   818 
 
Table 4. Distribution of firms across countries* 
 
Table 5. Distribution of firms by size* 
 
Firm size 
Foreign 
ownership   
0 1   
        
Small (5-19) 424 20 444 
Medium (20-99) 232 28 260 
Large (>=100) 90 24 114 
        
Total 746 72 818 
 
*Firm with more than 10% owned by foreign individuals/companies is defined as - Foreign firm. 
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Table 6. Distribution of firms by industry 
Industry 
Foreign 
ownership Total 
0 1 
Retail 35% 19% 34% 
Food 12% 25% 13% 
Construction Section 13% 8% 13% 
Other Manufacturing 7% 6% 7% 
Transport  Section 7% 6% 7% 
Hotel And Restaurants 6% 7% 6% 
Wholesale 4% 3% 4% 
Other Services 3% 0% 3% 
Non Metallic Mineral 3% 3% 3% 
Basic Metals 2% 1% 2% 
Textiles 1% 4% 2% 
Fabricate Metal Production 1% 3% 2% 
Machinery And Equipment 1% 4% 1% 
Chemicals 1% 4% 1% 
Garments 1% 0% 1% 
It 0% 4% 1% 
Electronics  0% 3% 1% 
Plastics & Rubber 1% 0% 0% 
 
 
Table 7. Country average perceptions of different obstacles 
 
  
Political 
instability 
Access to 
finance Corruption Tax rates Informal sector 
            
Armenia 2.287 1.747 1.679 2.091 1.894 
Azerbaijan 0.569 1.533 1.676 1.771 1.536 
Georgia 2.040 1.599 0.964 1.850 1.267 
            
South Caucasus 1.570 1.622 1.462 1.899 1.571 
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Table 8. Correlation between three different specifications of political instability  
 
  Initial measure Specification 1 Specification 2 
Initial measure 1.000     
Specification 1 0.855 1.000   
Specification 2 8.845 0.687 1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. The most serious obstacles in the region* 
 
most serious obstacle 
South Caucasus region 
Local Firms Foreign Firms 
Access to finance 22.30% 25.90% 
Tax rates 20.60% 14.80% 
Practice of competitors in informal sector 14.50% 13.00% 
Corruption 8.50% 11.10% 
Political instability 10.60% 11.10% 
Inadequately educated workforce 2.60% 5.60% 
Tax administration 5.20% 5.60% 
Transport 2.60% 3.70% 
Access to land 1.30% 1.90% 
Business licensing and permits 1.50% 1.90% 
Crime, theft and disorder 1.50% 1.90% 
Customs and trade regulations 4.50% 1.90% 
Electricity 2.60% 1.90% 
Courts 1.00% 0.00% 
Labor regulations 0.80% 0.00% 
 
                               * We exclude responses “don’t know” and “does not apply” 
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Annex 2 
Empirical results
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Table 1. Comparison of models (OLS, Tobit, Heckman , probit+truncated). 
      Heckman        
  
OLS Tobit Selection Model Probit Truncated 
  
R&D -2.321 -39.592 -0.349 10.855 -0.349 -1.042 
  (-0.898) (-1.359) (-1.506)    (-0.647) (-1.562) (-0.049) 
Product diversification 0.002 0.409 0.003 -0.286 0.003 -0.525 
  (-0.05) (-0.678) (-0.72) (-1.124)    (-0.694) (-1.318) 
Log (Firm size) 2.850*** 42.773*** 0.353*** -8.138 0.353*** -0.207 
  (-3.745) (-4.766) (-4.95) (-0.597)    (-5.606) (-0.031) 
Log (Productivity) 1.300** 24.142*** 0.195*** -3.867 0.195*** 0.017 
  (-2.31) (-3.388) (-3.079) (-0.442)    (-3.764) (-0.002) 
Log(age) -4.181*** -61.850*** -0.499*** 12.055 -0.499*** 6.067 
  (-3.951) (-3.950) (-3.962)    (-0.601) (-4.251) (-0.484) 
Certificate 9.444*** 80.176*** 0.673*** -26.753 0.673*** -6.795 
  (-3.176) (-3.206) (-4.017) (-0.998)    (-3.775) (-0.436) 
Political Instability             
              
Minor obstacle -3.001 -44.467 -0.396 -8.849 -0.396 -36.741 
  (-1.442) (-1.281) (-1.333)    (-0.460)    (-1.448) (-1.246) 
Moderate obstacle 1.602 34.267 0.292 -25.314*   0.292 -0.599 
  (-0.59) (-1.075) (-1.231) (-1.685)    -1.157 (-0.026) 
Major obstacle -0.885 -14.122 -0.086 -14.157 -0.086 -19.391 
  (-0.406) (-0.458) (-0.363)    (-1.371)    (-0.358) (-1.231) 
Very severe obstacle 0.049 -1.025 -0.115 4.2 -0.115 -28.198 
  (-0.018) (-0.030) (-0.443)    (-0.34) (-0.436) (-1.234) 
              
Constant -6.331 -458.711*** -3.657*** 184.458 -3.657*** 87.738 
  (-0.880) (-3.992) (-4.000)    (-0.947) (-4.642) (-0.772) 
              
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
                                          
sigma   133.586***                     23.452*** 
    (-7.868)                     (-5.162) 
lambda     -28.364       
      (-0.549)          
Note. The parentheses contain the t -statistics. * Significance at the 10% level. ** Idem., 5%. *** 
Idem., 1%. 
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Table 2. Model with additional country level controls (marginal effects are presented) 
  Specification 1 Specification 2 
  
Propensity 
of FDI 
Intensity of 
FDI 
Propensity 
of FDI 
Intensity of 
FDI 
                        
R&D -0.054*   -22.506 -0.047 -8.795 
  (-1.893)    (-0.994)    (-1.617)    (-0.434)    
Product diversification 0.000 -0.351 0 -0.383 
  (-0.623) (-0.775)    (-0.502) (-1.244)    
Log (Firm size) 0.044*** 5.695 0.042*** -0.353 
  (-5.322) (-0.732) (-5.159) (-0.054)    
Log (Productivity) -0.001 -2.294 0.002 0.379 
  (-0.166)    (-0.791)    (-0.623) (-0.143) 
Log(age) -0.062*** 7.339 -0.061*** 5.379 
  (-4.384)    (-0.528) (-4.193)    (-0.397) 
Certificate 0.090*** -9.441 0.087*** -12.855 
  (-4.189) (-0.746)    (-4.063) (-0.825)    
Political instability -0.032 -31.986*   -0.025 -31.436*   
  (-1.599)    (-1.807)    (-1.289)    (-1.793)    
Corruption 0.044**  -5.589 0.019 2.466 
  (-2.167) (-0.475)    (-0.942) (-0.149) 
Tax rates -0.054*** -10.833 -0.035*   -7.564 
  (-2.738)    (-0.872)    (-1.713)    (-0.363)    
Informal sector 0.004 -11.509 -0.004 -7.346 
  (-0.198) (-0.868)    (-0.216)    (-0.458)    
Access to finance 0.002 13.625 -0.001 -9.576 
  (-0.108) (-0.935) (-0.035)    (-0.463)    
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES 
Sigma   24.731***   24.336*** 
    (-4.631)   (-4.41) 
 
Note. The parentheses contain the t -statistics. * Significance at the 10% level. ** Idem., 5%. 
 *** Idem., 1%. 
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Table 3. Model with different quintiles of foreign share (99%, 95%, 90%, 75%) 
  Foreign share (99 quantile) Foreign share (95 quantile) Foreign share (90 quantile) Foreign share (75 quantile) 
  
Propensity  Intensity  Propensity  Intensity  Propensity  Intensity  Propensity  Intensity  
R&D -0.053**  -28.416 -0.057**  -24.607*   -0.049*   -18.684*   -0.031 2.256 
  (-1.996)    (-1.515)    (-2.140)    (-1.767)    (-1.933)    (-1.719)    (-1.455)    (-0.222) 
Product diversification 0.000 -0.087 0.000 -0.190 0.000 -0.062 0.000 -0.025 
  -0.601 (-0.326)    (-0.452) (-0.898)    (-0.427) (-0.418)    (-0.782) (-0.172) 
Log (Firm size) 0.033*** 8.439 0.031*** 2.755 0.029*** 1.78 0.023*** -4.577* 
  -4.349 (-1.247) (-4.203) (-0.579) -4.04 (-0.458) (-3.416) (-1.685) 
Log (Productivity) 0.001 -1.787 0.001 -0.412 0.000 -1.240 0.002 -0.474 
  -0.231 (-0.737)    (-0.362) (-0.211)    (-0.030)    (-0.723)    (-0.782) (-0.238) 
Log(age) -0.048*** -2.539 -0.050*** -6.828 -0.049*** -11.763**  -0.028*** -0.438 
  (-3.788)    (-0.230)    (-3.868)    (-0.882)    (-3.844)    (-1.974)    (-2.603)    (-0.076) 
Certificate 0.066*** -6.911 0.068*** 1.04 0.063*** 3.354 0.042**  -7.428* 
  -3.494 (-0.633)    (-3.685) (-0.159) (-3.426) (-0.664) (-2.472) (-1.765) 
Political instability -0.027 -37.491**  -0.026 -27.462*** -0.018 -17.961**  -0.01 -5.933 
  (-1.521)    (-2.529)    (-1.509)    (-2.919)    (-1.073)    (-2.415)    (-0.694)    (-0.860) 
Corruption 0.036**  -7.542 0.030*   -11.950*   0.024 -15.071*** 0.029**  -5.426 
  -2.083 (-0.748)    (-1.812) (-1.819)    (-1.521) (-2.621)    (-1.961) (-1.472) 
Tax rates -0.026 -15.539 -0.023 -9.446 -0.020 -8.712 -0.021 -1.198 
  (-1.498)    (-1.448)    (-1.381)    (-1.144)    (-1.216)    (-1.139)    (-1.436)    (-0.089) 
Informal sector -0.007 -10.084 -0.007 -7.159 -0.007 -0.039 -0.009 1.137 
  (-0.370)    (-0.929)    (-0.384)    (-0.886)    (-0.389)    (-0.007)    (-0.597)    (-0.197) 
Access to finance -0.004 21.150*   -0.003 16.604*   0.002 13.325*   0.001 -0.994 
  (-0.223)    (-1.681) (-0.157)   (-1.801) (-0.105) (-1.796) (-0.062) (-0.104) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sigma    21.731***    16.263***   13.248***    9.291*** 
    (-4.894)   (-5.728)   (-6.007)   (-4.133) 
Note. The parentheses contain the t -statistics. * Significance at the 10% level. ** Idem., 5%. *** Idem., 1%. 
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Chart 2. Relationship between foreign share and 
political instability (all foreign firms) 
 
Chart 3. Relationship between foreign share and 
political instability (only joint venture, excluding full 
ownership) 
 
 
Chart 1. Distribution of foreign share 
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Table 4. Robustness check with different specifications 
  
Non - Oil industry Joint Venture 
Size of the Firm  
(without top 5%) 
Productivity of the Firm 
(without top 5%) 
Non-exporting Firm 
  Propensity  Intensity  Propensity  Intensity Propensity  Intensity  Propensity  Intensity  Propensity  Intensity  
R&D -0.057*   -26.507 -0.055**  -22.506 -0.045 -36.263 -0.065**  -13.123 -0.018 -58.917*** 
  (-1.845)    (-1.256) (-2.040)    (-0.994) (-1.642)    (-1.315) (-2.170)    (-0.548) (-0.710)    (-2.580)    
Product diversification 0.001 -0.097 0.000 -0.351 0.000 0.152 0.000 -0.406 0.000 -0.029 
  (-1.631) (-0.265) (-0.491) (-0.775) (-0.719) (-0.53) (-0.541) (-0.817) (-0.169)    (-0.055)    
Log (Firm size) 0.052*** 8.387 0.033*** 5.695 0.051*** 16.368* 0.048*** 3.518 0.036*** 21.550*** 
  (-5.648) (-1.112) (-4.389) (-0.732) (-5.167) (-1.793) (-5.708) (-0.426) (-4.618) (-2.62) 
Log (Productivity) -0.001 -2.086 0.000 -2.294 -0.001 -1.804 -0.002 -1.077 -0.001 -3.75 
  (-0.228)    (-0.721) (-0.129) (-0.791) (-0.185)    (-0.593) (-0.598)    (-0.352) (-0.319)    (-1.300)    
Log(age) -0.060*** -2.303 -0.045*** 7.339 -0.059*** 13.414 -0.064*** 12.549 -0.055*** 22.968 
  (-3.923)    (-0.182) (-3.459)    (-0.528) (-4.222)    (-1.024) (-4.495)    (-0.923) (-3.940)    (-1.326) 
Certificate 0.098*** -11.588 0.064*** -9.441 0.091*** -20.005* 0.081*** -7.307 0.096*** -25.287**  
  (-4.204) (-0.823) (-3.322) (-0.746) (-4.358) (-1.901) (-3.643) (-0.503) (-4.61) (-2.034)    
Political instability -0.03 -32.187* -0.022 -31.986* -0.021 -34.669** -0.028 -29.461* -0.036*   -45.915**  
  (-1.384)    (-1.802) (-1.252)    (-1.807) (-1.115)    (-2.060) (-1.430)    (-1.639) (-1.819)    (-2.028)    
Corruption 0.048**  -8.057 0.040**  -5.589 0.049**  3.676 0.049**  -13.391 0.043**  3.569 
  (-2.178) (-0.662) (-2.293) (-0.475) (-2.44) (-0.345) (-2.412) (-0.950) (-2.127) (-0.306) 
Tax rates -0.058*** -13.004 -0.029*   -10.833 -0.062*** -19.691* -0.059*** -15.819 -0.050**  -16.116 
  (-2.755)    (-0.992) (-1.683)    (-0.872) (-3.136)    (-1.697) (-3.019)    (-1.112) (-2.556)    (-1.539)    
Informal sector 0.014 -7.317 -0.008 -11.509 0.000 -22.392* 0.011 -10.304 0.020 -32.161**  
  (-0.642) (-0.559) (-0.477)    (-0.868) (-0.021)    (-1.660) (-0.568) (-0.716) (-1.046) (-1.967)    
Access to finance 0.004 19.751 -0.007 13.625 0.008 21.114 0.000 22.081 -0.011 37.841**  
  (-0.178) (-1.25) (-0.403)    (-0.935) (-0.399) (-1.632) (-0.002) (-1.333) (-0.580)    (-2.546) 
Industry dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
sigma   22.714***   24.731***   20.332***   
 
24.969***    18.894*** 
    (-4.542)   (-4.631)   (-5.853)   (-4.433)   (-5.955) 
Note. The parentheses contain the t -statistics. * Significance at the 10% level. ** Idem., 5%. *** Idem., 1%. 
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Table 5. Model – political instability interaction with oil dummy 
  
Propensity of FDI Intensity of FDI 
  beta margins beta margins 
  baseline ( 0 0 ) - no political instability and no oil 
0 1 -0.403   26.197   
  (-0.963)   -1.537   
1 0 -0.243   -40.334*   
  (-1.482)   (-1.936)   
1 1 -0.565   20.573   
  (-1.432)   (-0.628)   
Political instability   -0.028   -36.792* 
    (-1.518)      (-1.917) 
Oil   -0.04   38.947* 
    (-1.369)      (-1.867) 
R&D -0.428* -0.053*   -14.948 -14.948 
  (-1.869) (-1.867)    (-0.665) (-0.665) 
Product diversification 0.003 0.000 -0.495 -0.495 
  (-0.683) (-0.68) (-1.229) (-1.229) 
Log (Firm size) 0.360*** 0.045*** 5.188 5.188 
  (-5.537) (-5.382) -0.749 -0.749 
Log (Productivity) 0.00 0.00 -3.599 -3.599 
  (-0.132) (-0.132)    (-1.054) (-1.054) 
Log(age) -0.482*** -0.060*** 8.238 8.238 
  (-4.182) (-4.159)    (-0.602) (-0.602) 
Certificate 0.734*** 0.091*** -2.527 -2.527 
  (-4.218) (-4.242) (-0.199) (-0.199) 
corruption 0.365** 0.045**  -3.315 -3.315 
  (-2.236) (-2.231) (-0.295) (-0.295) 
tax -0.429*** -0.053*** -13.741 -13.741 
  (-2.713) (-2.705)    (-1.201) (-1.201) 
informal 0.023 0.003 -5.728 -5.728 
  (-0.148) (-0.148) (-0.475) (-0.475) 
finance 0.004 0.001 18.348 18.348 
  (-0.027) (-0.027) (-1.342) (-1.342) 
Constant -1.660**   100.628*   
  (-2.279)   (-1.672)   
sigma       23.378*** 
        (-4.863) 
 
Note. The parentheses contain the t -statistics. * Significance at the 10% level. ** Idem., 
5%. 
 *** Idem., 1%. 
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Table 6. Model with regional average perception of political instability 
  Propensity  Intensity  
R&D -0.049* 0.748    
  (-1.725) (0.032)    
Product 
diversification 0.001 -0.220    
  (0.892) (-0.708)    
Log (Firm size) 0.044*** 0.182    
  (5.396) (0.027)    
Log (Productivity) 0.003 1.674    
  (0.792) (0.571)    
Log(age) -0.063*** -0.700    
  (-4.620) (-0.066)    
Certificate 0.087*** -21.026    
  (4.006) (-1.334)    
Political instability -0.079** -62.039**  
  (-2.420) (-2.134)    
Informal sector 0.005 -3.546    
  (0.233) (-0.289)    
Corruption 0.036* -6.426    
  (1.813) (-0.566)    
Access to finance 0.000 2.006    
  (0.022) (0.146)    
Tax rates -0.055*** -5.737    
  (-2.842) (-0.442)    
Industry dummies YES YES 
sigma   24.313*** 
    (4.754)    
 
Note. The parentheses contain the t -statistics. * Significance at the 10% level. ** Idem., 5%. *** 
Idem., 1%. 
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Table 7. Regional average perception of obstacles 
  Part I Part 2 
  
Political instability Corruption Tax Informal sector Access to finance 
Political 
instability 
specificatin 1 
Georgia             
Tbilisi 2.197 0.746 1.493 0.986 1.239 0.831 
Imereti 2.255 2.255 2.553 2.468 2.723 0.957 
Kakheti 1.776 0.429 1.633 0.837 1.102 0.612 
Kvemo Kartli 2.125 0.625 2.000 1.750 1.500 0.625 
Mtskheta-Mtianeti 1.348 0.739 1.043 0.565 1.217 0.609 
Shida Kartli 2.184 0.735 2.265 1.204 1.735 0.755 
              
Armenia             
Yerevan 2.407 1.934 2.054 2.168 1.790 0.838 
North 3.051 0.950 2.750 1.150 1.800 0.900 
South-East 1.538 1.231 1.673 1.173 1.365 0.673 
South-West 2.423 1.500 2.654 2.154 2.192 0.923 
              
Azerbaijan             
Baku & Apsherons 0.890 1.729 1.519 1.160 1.072 0.398 
Aranski & Gorno-Shirvanski 0.159 1.477 2.091 2.364 2.091 0.068 
Giandja-Kazakhski & Sheki-
Zakatalski 0.036 1.764 2.236 1.800 2.273 0.018 
Lenkoranski & Kuba-Khachmazski 0.154 1.462 2.000 2.192 2.231 0.115 
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Table 8. Co – occurrence matrix between obstacles 
  
Total Local Foreign Oil industry 
Non Oil 
industry 
More 
productive 
firms  
Less 
productive 
firms 
10000 5.7% 6.2% 0.0% 8.5% 5.1% 3.5% 9.0% 
10001 5.4% 5.5% 3.7% 6.8% 5.1% 4.0% 7.5% 
10010 2.4% 2.6% 0.0% 1.7% 2.5% 3.0% 1.5% 
10011 4.5% 4.9% 0.0% 6.8% 4.0% 2.5% 7.5% 
10100 5.1% 4.2% 14.8% 1.7% 5.8% 7.0% 2.3% 
10101 5.7% 5.9% 3.7% 8.5% 5.1% 4.0% 8.3% 
10110 1.8% 2.0% 0.0% 1.7% 1.8% 2.0% 1.5% 
10111 5.7% 6.2% 0.0% 8.5% 5.1% 8.0% 2.3% 
11000 7.8% 6.5% 22.2% 13.6% 6.5% 4.0% 13.5% 
11001 6.0% 5.9% 7.4% 6.8% 5.8% 5.0% 7.5% 
11010 3.6% 3.3% 7.4% 0.0% 4.4% 4.5% 2.3% 
11011 4.5% 4.2% 7.4% 0.0% 5.5% 5.5% 3.0% 
11100 4.2% 4.6% 0.0% 1.7% 4.7% 5.0% 3.0% 
11101 8.4% 9.1% 0.0% 6.8% 8.7% 7.0% 10.5% 
11110 10.2% 9.4% 18.5% 11.9% 9.8% 14.9% 3.0% 
11111 19.2% 19.5% 14.8% 15.3% 20.0% 20.4% 17.3% 
*All combinations have the following order: 
1. Political instability;  
2. Corruption;  
3. Access to finance;  
4. Competition to informal sector;  
5. Tax rates; 
 So, combination 10000 means that only political instability is an obstacle.  
**Productive is a binary variable. =1 higher than regional median productivity, =0 otherwise. 
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Table 9. Complementary check 
  
Political instability  
and  
Corruption 
Political instability  
and  
Finance 
Political instability  
and  
Tax rates 
Political instability  
and  
Informal Sector 
                  
  Propensity  Intensity   Propensity  Intensity  Propensity  Intensity Propensity   Intensity 
Q00 -0.196**  -24.53 -0.192**  90.569 -0.200**  77.605 -0.195**  75.636 
  (-2.188)    (-0.470)    (-2.097)    (-1.469) (-2.196)    (-1.262) (-2.167)    (-1.212) 
Q01 -0.162*   -73.076 -0.194**  86.365 -0.248*** 70.258 -0.190**  51.993 
  (-1.856)    (-1.309)    (-2.107)    (-1.355) (-2.769)    (-1.046) (-2.179)    (-0.78) 
Q10 -0.246*** -162.227**  -0.229**  34.392 -0.225**  50.595 -0.225**  29.965 
  (-2.701)    (-2.055)    (-2.489)    (-0.482) (-2.457)    (-0.753) (-2.463)    (-0.44) 
Q11 -0.183**  -69.673 -0.221**  75.877 -0.287*** 34.217 -0.224**  45.222 
  (-2.017)    (-1.253)    (-2.289)    (-1.17) (-3.025)    (-0.5) (-2.433)    (-0.651) 
R&D -0.052*   -6.797 -0.054*   -17.439 -0.054*   -21.587 -0.054*   -17.686 
  (-1.850)    (-0.364)    (-1.892)    (-0.796) (-1.902)    (-0.936) (-1.893)    (-0.820) 
Product 
diversification 0.000 0.188 0.000 -0.455 0.000 -0.3 0.000 -0.247 
  (-0.688) (-0.368) (-0.608) (-1.055) (-0.674) (-0.674) (-0.621) (-0.530) 
Log 
(Productivity) 0.000 2.011 -0.001 -2.941 0.000 -2.43 -0.001 -2.235 
  (-0.151)    (-1.079) (-0.191)    (-1.042) (-0.148)    (-0.855) (-0.155)    (-0.926) 
Log (Firm 
size) 0.044*** 17.217**  0.044*** 6.643 0.044*** 5.538 0.044*** 5.36 
  (-5.33) (-2.34) (-5.322) (-0.84) (-5.31) (-0.697) (-5.324) (-0.694) 
Log(age) -0.062*** -4.354 0.091*** -2.175 0.090*** -10.318 0.090*** -8.845 
  (-4.374)    (-0.492)    (-4.199) (-0.187) (-4.198) (-0.788) (-4.19) (-0.779) 
Certificate 0.089*** -25.110**  -0.063*** 11.511 -0.062*** 7.151 -0.062*** 8.213 
  (-4.168) (-1.994)    (-4.358)    (-0.785) (-4.356)    (-0.525) (-4.397)    (-0.643) 
                  
Corruption     0.045**  4.688 0.043**  -6.154 0.044**  -8.17 
      (-2.213) (-0.302) (-2.143) (-0.516) (-2.174) (-0.709) 
Access to 
finance 0.004 31.778**      0.001 12.625 0.002 6.433 
  (-0.214) (-2.009)     (-0.073) (-0.792) (-0.108) (-0.469) 
Tax rates -0.053*** -11.004 -0.053*** -2.749     -0.054*** -5.497 
  (-2.692)    (-1.010)    (-2.725)    (-0.257)     (-2.740)    (-0.476) 
Informal 
Sector 0.003 -27.850*   0.004 -17.663 0.004 -11.034     
  (-0.157) (-1.805)    (-0.192) (-1.218) (-0.206) (-0.818)     
 
Note. The parentheses contain the t -statistics. * Significance at the 10% level. ** Idem., 5%. *** Idem., 1%. 
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Table 10.  Interaction between perception of political instability and corruption 
  
Note. The parentheses contain the t -statistics. * Significance at the 10% level. ** Idem., 5%. *** Idem., 1%. 
 
  Intensity  
    
    
Political instability and 
corruption 141.101*** 
  (-2.636) 
Political instability -137.698*** 
  (-2.882) 
Corruption -48.546** 
  (-2.161) 
    
R&D -6.797 
  (-0.364) 
Product diversification 0.188 
  (-0.368) 
Log (Firm size) 17.217** 
  (-2.34) 
Log (Productivity) 2.011 
  (-1.079) 
Log(age) -4.354 
  (-0.492) 
Certificate -25.110** 
  (-1.994) 
Tax rates -11.004 
  (-1.010) 
Informal sector -27.850* 
  (-1.805) 
Access to finance 31.778** 
  (-2.009) 
Constant -24.53 
  (-0.470) 
Industry dummies YES 
Sigma 19.703*** 
  (-5.854) 
Political instability 
Marginal 
effects 
    
Corruption - 0 -137.697*** 
  (-2.88) 
Corruption - 1 3.403 
  (-0.25) 
Overall -54.189*** 
  (-2.89) 
 
Corruption 
Marginal 
effects 
    
Political - 0 -48.546** 
  (-2.16) 
Political - 1 92.554*** 
  (2.73) 
Overall 3.287 
  (0.38) 
 
Table 11. Marginal effect of political instability 
Table 12. Marginal effect of corruption 
 
57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3 
Methodology description  
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Table 1. Definition of oil industry21 
Desctiption Isic code  Rev.3.1 Number of Firms 
Gas-Distributing System Service 5260 5 
Sale Of Liquefied Gas 5259 
3 
Liquefied Gas 5259 
Gas Sales 5251 
5 Gas. Lpg 5251 
Public Gas Service 5251 
Sale Of Gas 5219 
6 
Liquified Gas 5219 
Selling Of Liquefied Gas 5190 
16 
Solid, Liquid And Gas Fuels. 5190 
Sales Of Liquefied Hydrocarbon Gas 5141 
3 
Sale And Delivery Of Liquified Gas 5141 
Gas Sales 5141 
Gas Retail 5141 
Gasoline 5141 
Sale Of Liquefied Gas 5050 
16 
Selling Gas Fuel 5050 
Liquid Oil Gas 5050 
Trade Of Gaseous Fuels 5050 
Motor Fuel (Liquefied Gas) 5050 
Construction Of Gas Supply 4520 
67 
Building  Of Oil And Gas Constructions 4520 
High Voltage Gas 3190 1 
Gas Cocks 2899 5 
Liquid And Gas Oxigen 2429 
2 
Technical Gas, Production 2429 
Manufacturing And Trading Of  
Technical Gases And Gas Mixtures 
2411 1 
 
                                                          
21 United nations statistics division. 
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Worldwide Governance Indicator  
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism      
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measure perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated 
violence, including terrorism. This table lists the individual variables from each data sources used to construct this measure in the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators Representative Sources. 
Table 2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (WGI) 
EIU GCS HUM IJT IPD PRS WMO 
Orderly transfers          
Cost of Terrorism 
Political terror 
scale      
Security Risk 
Rating      
Intensity of 
internal conflicts    
Government stability 
Protests and riots 
Armed conflict             
Intensity of violent 
activities     
Internal conflict 
Terrorism 
Violent demonstrations                
Intensity of social 
conflicts   
External conflict 
Interstate war 
Social Unrest                  Ethnic tensions Civil war 
International tensions / 
terrorist threat                  
EIU  -  Economist Intelligence Unit Riskwire & Democracy Index 
GCS  - World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 
HUM -  Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database and Political Terror Scale 
IJT -  iJET Country Security Risk Ratings 
IPD -  Institutional Profiles Database 
IPD -  Institutional Profiles Database 
PRS -  Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide 
WMO -  Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicato 
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The Economist measure of political instability 
 
The overall index on a scale of 0 (no vulnerability) to 10 (highest vulnerability) has two 
component indexes—an index of underlying vulnerability and an economic distress index. 
The overall index is a simple average of the two component indices. There are 15 indicators 
in all—12 for the underlying and 3 for the economic distress index. 
  
Table 3. The Economist Intelligent Unit 
Underlying vulnerability Economic distress 
Inequality Growth in income 
State history Unemployment 
Corruption level of income per head 
Ethnic fragmentation   
Trust in institution   
Status of minorities   
History of political instability   
Proclivity of labour unrest   
Level of social provision   
A country's neighbourhood   
Regime type   
Regime type and factionalism   
 
 
 
Table 4. Cross country correlation between three different measures of political instability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  BEEPS The Economist WGI 
BEEPS 1.000     
The 
Economist 0.422 1.000   
WGI 0.259 0.640 1.000 
In case of BEEPS measure we use country average perceptions. In total we have 30 countries. 
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Table 5. Country ranking based on three different measures of political instability 
  BEEPS 2009   The Economist   
Worldwide Governance 
indicators 
                  
Ranking Country Index   Country Index   Country Index 
1 Ukraine 2.7   Ukraine 7.6   Turkey 3.5 
2 Turkey 2.5   Bosnia and Herze 7.5   Tajikistan 3.5 
3 Armenia 2.3   Moldova 7.5   Uzbekistan 3.5 
4 Albania 2.2   Kyrgyz Republic 7.1   Russia 3.5 
5 Latvia 2.2   Tajikistan 7.1   Georgia 3.4 
6 Bosnia and Herze 2.2   Turkey 6.8   Bosnia and Herze 3.2 
7 Serbia 2.2   Estonia 6.7   Kyrgyz Republic 3.1 
8 Kyrgyz Republic 2.1   Latvia 6.7   Moldova 3.1 
9 Lithuania 2.1   Fyr Macedonia 6.6   Serbia 3.0 
10 Hungary 2.1   Russia 6.5   Ukraine 2.8 
11 Poland 2.1   Montenegro 6.4   Azerbaijan 2.8 
12 Georgia 2.0   Romania 6.4   FYR Macedonia 2.8 
13 Russia 2.0   Serbia 6.4   Albania 2.6 
14 Moldova 1.9   Georgia 6.3   Armenia 2.3 
15 Romania 1.8   Uzbekistan 6.3   Bulgaria 2.2 
16 Mongolia 1.8   Albania 6.2   Latvia 2.2 
17 Czech Republic 1.7   Croatia 6.1   Romania 2.1 
18 Bulgaria 1.6   Hungary 6.1   Belrus 2.0 
19 Fyr Macedonia 1.6   Lithuania 6.1   Hungary 2.0 
20 Slovak Republic 1.5   Mongolia 6.1   Estonia 2.0 
21 Kazakhstan 1.4   Bulgaria 6.0   Croatia 1.9 
22 Estonia 1.4   Armenia 5.8   Lithuania 1.9 
23 Tajikistan 1.3   Slovak Republic 5.5   Mongolia 1.9 
24 Croatia 1.3   Azerbaijan 5.2   Kazakhstan 1.8 
25 Belarus 1.2   Belarus 4.8   Montenegro 1.7 
26 Uzbekistan 0.9   Kazakhstan 4.8   Czech Republic 1.6 
27 Slovenia 0.8   Poland 4.5   Slovak Republic 1.6 
28 Montenegro 0.6   Slovenia 3.8   Slovenia 1.6 
29 Azerbaijan 0.6   Czech Republic 3.7   Poland 1.6 
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Chart 1. Relationship between political stability* and corruption 
 
*Political stability is measured as “ 4 – political instability”. 
Perception of political instability and corruption are averaged by country. 
Chart 1 corresponds the argument of U shape relationship between political stability and corruption 
based on 30 countries22. If we analyze only South Caucasus region we see the heterogeneity between 
countries (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan). Azerbaijan and Armenia are two extreme points in the U 
shape curve. Demand effect dominants in Azerbaijan which cause that we have high stability together 
with high corruption. But in case of Armenia, horizon effect is the leading force, low stability associates 
with high corruption. Among these three countries Georgia characterizes as a stable country in terms of 
political stability and corruption. These diversified effects across countries do not show a clear picture 
about the whole region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Whole sample of BEEPS 2009 data. 
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Checking the supermodularity 
 
Definition: If 𝐶𝑗
′ and 𝐶𝑗
′′ are two elements in the obstacle set. FDI propensity/intensity function 
𝐹(𝐶𝑗; 𝜃𝑖𝑗) is supermodular if and only if 𝐹(𝐶𝑗
′; 𝜃𝑖𝑗) +  𝐹(𝐶𝑗
′′; 𝜃𝑖𝑗)  ≤  𝐹(𝐶𝑗
′ ∆ 𝐶𝑗
′ ;  𝜃𝑖𝑗) +
 𝐹(𝐶𝑗
′ ∇ 𝐶𝑗
′′ ;  𝜃𝑖𝑗).  (Milgrom and Roberts (1990)). 
 
A Simple Example: 
A simple example might be useful for illustrative purposes. Let’s assume that we have two binary 
decision variables, which implies that the set of all possible combination consists of four elements C 
={{00};{01}{10};{11}}. For example, {00} shows that firms do not face either political instability or 
corruption. Using the above definition of supermodularity implies that there is only one nontrivial 
inequality constraint 𝐼(10) + 𝐼(01) ≤ 𝐼(00) + 𝐼(11) which show that the sum of individual effects is 
not higher than the simultaneous effect. 
Testing complementarity is the same as checking the supermodularity. First step to test the inequality 
constraints and also the complementarity, we need consistent estimates of the effects of obstacles on 
FDI propensity (?̂?𝑖𝑗) / intensity (?̃?𝑖𝑗). As we mentioned above FDI propensity/intensity function depends 
on several country level obstacles as well as other firm level characteristics. 
 
 
𝐹 = ∑ ∑ 𝑄𝑖𝑗
1
𝑗=0
× 𝑠𝑖𝑗 × (
1
𝑖=0
𝛾 × 𝑊) + (𝜇 × 𝑞) + 𝜖 
 
Where Q00, Q10, Q01, Q11 show all possible pairs of obstacles. This equation is without constant term.  
If two policies are complement the following inequality holds, 
𝑠10 + 𝑠01 ≤  𝑠00 + 𝑠11 
When we already know the consistent estimates of 𝑠𝑖𝑗 we can use the test for complementarity. We have 
to check the following hypothesis: 
𝐻0 ∶  ℎ0 < 0                   [Test 1 – strict Supermodularity] 
𝐻1 ∶  ℎ0 ≥ 0 
Where ℎ0 = 𝑠10 + 𝑠01 −  𝑠00 − 𝑠11. This is a test for strict supermodularity. The test accepts 𝐻0   
whenever the constraint is negative. Rejection the null hypothesis does not imply that the two obstacles 
are substitutes, because 𝐻1 includes also the case of equality (ℎ0 = 0). 
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Consistent estimates of the parameters 𝑠𝑖𝑗 are obtained by estimating probit + truncated model. We use 
the estimates of ?̂?𝑖𝑗 and ?̃?𝑖𝑗 to calculate the tests of complementarity for both propensity of FDI (through 
?̂?𝑖𝑗) as well as the intensity of FDI (through ?̃?𝑖𝑗 ). 
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